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Abstract 
Over the last decade, important decentralization processes and agrarian reforms have taken place 
in many tropical countries, with the purpose of transferring rights and responsibilities to forest 
communities. These reforms have resulted in an intensive academic debate on governance and 
management of forests and how actors should be involved. An important but understudied 
element in this debate is the way in which communities cope with new legislation and 
responsibilities. Property rights bestowed by the government leave many aspects un-decided and 
require that local forest users devise principles of access and allocation and establish authority to 
control those processes. We studied 16 communities in the northern Bolivian Amazon to evaluate 
how forest communities develop and control local rules for resource access and use. We found that 
the first requirement to community rule design, enforcement, and effective forest management is 
the opportunity to, and equity of, access to forest resources among members. Under the newly 
imposed forestry regulations, communities took matters in their own hands, and designed more 
specific rules rights and obligations of how community members could and should use 
economically important resources. The cases suggest that communities maintain capacity to 
prepare their own ownership arrangements and related rules, even if they are strongly conditioned 
by the regulatory reforms. Very specific local histories, that may differ from community to 
community, influence strongly how specific ideas are being shaped, which in northern Bolivia 
resulted in notable local differences. The results suggest that new regulatory regimes should 
consider options that given the adequate conditions, communities can define adequate or at least 
convenient forestry institutions that assure an acceptable level of collective coexistence according 
to each particular communal history. 
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Tropical forest governance has changed profoundly over the last two decades as a result of various 
concurring processes. Many tropical forest countries reorganized the state and gave lower tiers of 
government more administrative responsibility and more control over public financial resources. 
Land and forest tenure reforms brought large areas of forest land under control of indigenous or 
other long-time resident groups. The same tropical forest countries also reformed legislation that 
effected forests, the forest sector and people living in forested areas. Researchers, however, have 
been skeptical about how much these changes have improved democratic natural resource 
decision making (Andersson et al., 2006; Ribot, 2003). Some unresolved constraints remain the 
limitations or unwillingness of local governments to involve citizens (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; 
Blair, 2000; Pacheco, 2000), the limited overall performance of local governments (Andersson, 
2004), problems arising from the need to address equity and accountability simultaneously (Nygren, 
2005), and conflicting overlapping authorities between different tiers of government (Andersson 
and Ostrom, 2008). In this paper, we analyze local forest governance responses among forest 
communities in the northern Bolivia Amazon following forestry, land and democratic reforms. 
 
The case of local responses to forest regulatory reforms in Bolivia relates to different academic 
debates. Since the 1990s Ostrom (1990) and her collaborators began to investigate collective action 
related to natural resource that are of interest to multiple users, but are difficult to privatize. This 
research has resulted in a well-developed theoretical body on how local users develop rules and 
regulations (institutions) and overcome the free rider, c.q. tragedy of the commons syndrome 
(Hardin, 1969). Some key features are, for instance, design principles for common property 
resource systems (Ostrom, 1990; 1999; 2009). Key elements are that both resources and the users 
of the resources need to have a number of attributes for common property resource (CPR) 
governance arrangements to be able to work acceptably. The robust and long during institutions 
that eventually are devised by the user groups also have certain common characteristics. This 
insight, Ostrom (1999) suggest, possibly could be used to actually design natural resource 
governing institutions in cases where problems of overuse and subsequent deterioration was 
observed, as was and still is the case in many places where forest dwellers depend for livelihood 
needs. A critical self-review of the design principles suggest that they hold up reasonably well in the 
majority of the cases (Ostrom, 2009), but Campbell et al. (2001), among others, suggest that cases 
from Zimbabwe but also from elsewhere of CPR governance regimes that eventually broke down 
suggest that the design principles have limited validity in many forest settings. 
 
A second body of literature that is relevant for the case that we investigate is the academic debate 
on decentralization and its impact on forest dweller communities. Many studies that contribute to 
this debate departed from the trend in many tropical forest countries in the 1990s of wider 
national governance reforms that essentially shifted authority and responsibility to lower tiers of 
government. Decentralization, it was held, would first of all increase efficiency and effectiveness of 
public administration (Ribot, 2003). Perceived additional benefits are that decentralized 
government could increase democratization and accountability, both key attributes of what came 
to be understood as “good governance”. One of the main findings of many of the decentralization 
and local forest user was that decentralization brought the political process that affects forest close 
to the users, and that this indeed may result in better policies and administration. However, with 
the exception of a handful of countries, including Bolivia, decentralization as a rule did not increase 
the legally recognized and protected rights to participate in, for instance, forestry related decision 
making (Larson et al., 2007). 
 
Academics have tried to link decentralization and local institutional capacity and dynamics with the 
concept polycentric governance (Anderson and Ostrom, 2008; Nagendra and Ostrom, 2010). 
Polycentric governance has a normative connotation, as it implies that governance acts, for 
instance policy, should considers higher and lower governance administrative levels to be more 
effective and efficient. Anderson and Ostrom (2008: 78) argue that when general rule systems 
designed at higher administrative levels are not fine-tuned to local context, they will weaken local 
incentives to manage resource responsibly. Hence, polycentric governance is more appropriate to 
overcome the widely reported limited intended results of decentralization reforms. While the 
concept of polycentric governance has been explored conceptually, little empirical evidence has 
been provided of how different polycentric forest governance or more specific forest policies 
actually affect local institutional dynamics or local capacities and incentives to invest in definition of 
property rights and related natural resource local rules. 
 
Policy reforms that affect multiple domains are oftentimes broad and contradictory (Pacheco, 
2009; Pachecho et al., 2008; Pacheco, 2007; Luoga et al., 2005; Barry and Leigh, 2008) and they 
require further steps to adequately be implemented at local levels. Communities may opt to adapt 
customary property rights or customary rules to the new legal framework (Cronkleton et al., 2007; 
Rist et al., 2007) or may persuade governments to recognize customary rules, even if they 
contradict the new legal regime (Fitzpatrick, 2005; Gibson et al., 2005). It is not immediately clear 
whether if CPR institution design principles, or other principles deducted from autonomous 
institutional solutions to CPR challenges, will also apply in such cases. Until now, yet little evidence 
has been put forward of how communities resolve internally issues of ownership or use rights 
when new legislation redefines property rights and procedures to commercially exploit forest 
resources, as has happened in Bolivia since the mid-1990s. 
 
Considering the above, this paper explores the questions: How do local communities respond to 
and how do they define their own arrangements under new forest and land regulatory regimes? In 
particular we seek answers to the questions: How much do such regulatory reforms constrain or 
enable local capacities to devise local arrangements, and how important and relevant are social, 
cultural and historical attributes of the communities themselves that need to fend for themselves 
once forestry reforms have been imposed? We hypothesize that indeed local communities possess 
capacities to device local institutions to govern common forest resources, and that they can set 
those capacities to work, for instance when land and forestry regulatory reforms are imposed. 
However, as the results of our research confirmed, directions that communities take to device 
these local arrangements is not only influenced by attributes of the CPRs and the forest users, but 
also by local institutional histories. Even among communities that appear to deal with quite similar 
CPRs and that share the same cultural attributes and regional history, we observed very different 
outcomes (Cano, 2012), and this begs for explanation. Thus, we researched responses of forest 
communities in the northern Bolivian Amazon about 15 years after the country implemented 
wide-reaching land and forestry reforms which put a large part of the national territory, especially 
in the tropical forested east and north, under the control of rural villages and indigenous 
communities, in addition to implementing wide-reaching decentralization and popular participation 
reforms (Pacheco et al., 2009). 
 
The paper has six sections including this introduction. Section 2 presents the background to 
Bolivia’s decentralization, and agrarian and forestry reforms of the last 15 years. Section 3 
summarizes the research methods. Section 4 provides a basic typology of how rural people 
legitimize former rules and design new ones to distribute land within their community, and to 
secure access to valuable forest resources. Section 5 suggests some theoretical implications of the 
empirical findings, and section 6 concludes. 
   
2 Legal reforms and communities in the northern Bolivian Amazon 
 
Bolivia’s experienced during the mid-1990s wide reaching regulatory reforms. The Popular 
Participation Law transferred responsibilities and an important share of the national budget 
directly to municipal governments, and promoted social participation in public administration 
(Pacheco, 2010). The Administrative Decentralization Law abolished the departmental corporations 
and transferred their functions to the prefectural government. Both laws gave municipal 
governments significant responsibilities over public services like health, education, roads, irrigation, 
culture and sports and allocated resources to pay for those services. The laws established local 
oversight committees, and created many new municipalities (Faguet, 2004). The early 
decentralization laws, however, had little consequences for forest resource governance (Pacheco, 
2009; Andersson et al., 2006; Kaimowitz et al., 1998). Municipalities had limited possibilities to 
monitor timber harvesting as this was regulated under a different legal regime, and were not 
allowed to promote local forest initiatives. 
 
Simultaneously, a new land regime considered communal land titles in the Bolivian Amazon as the 
only feasible option to regularize ownership in communities with complex swidden-fallow and 
forest use practices (Stoian, 2005; Cronkleton et al., 2009). In the new Communal Redressing of 
Agrarian Reform Law (2006), communal title has become the only choice for new settlements in 
the former Brazil nuts estates or barracas. These reforms emphasized collective ownership and 
resulted in a significant distortion of peoples’ customary sense of ownership and tenure (Fitzpatrick, 
2005). Specifically for the northern Bolivian Amazon region Government Decree 25848 (2000) 
imposed that the communal title in the region was granted over an area using the formula of 
number of families in the community times 500 ha, although in practice there were significant 
differences among users and regions (e.g. Pando Department vs. Beni Department; Ruiz, 2005). 
 
The government recognized the need of local distribution of land and forest, but established that 
this should be done according to local uses and customs (usos y costumbres). The new Forest Law, 
which was part of the mid 1990s regulatory reforms, and its implementing regulations aimed to 
democratize procedures to benefit from forests that previously were limited to timber companies 
(Pacheco, 2009; Barry et al., 2010; Kaimowitz et al., 1998). The new forestry law obliged enterprises 
to exploit timber in forest concessions and granted communities the right to exploit timber and in 
theory other forest products by preparing forest management plans and annual forest operation 
plans (Pacheco, 2006). Little thought was given to how communities could comply with the 
required complicated and expensive formal procedures to that end (Pacheco, 2009). In practice, 
communities that hold tenure over extensive areas of forest have to negotiate with timber 
companies, because the latter have the capital, skills and administrative influence (Benneker, 2008; 
Zenteno, 2013). 
 
3 Research methods 
 
The research for this chapter was carried out in the prefectures (Departamentos) of Beni and 
Pando in the northern Bolivian Amazon, in which two of the main economic activities are Brazil nut 
harvesting and timber extraction. Until recently the social relationships in the region were 
reminiscent of the barraca system, a social and spatial organization of rubber and Brazil nut 
exploitation (Ruiz, 2005). A barraca in northern Bolivia refers to an area of forest that used to be 
controlled by a wealthy entrepreneur, to which a labor force was attached under debt-peonage 
arrangements (Cano, 2012; Stoian, 2005). 
 
We selected 16 communities on the basis of the main form of forest resource use (agro-extractives 
and extractives communities; cf. Stoian and Henkemans, 2000) and the year that the settlements 
were formally founded. Both characteristics influence the importance of forestry activities and this, 
should influence the response to forestry and land use legislative reforms. Older communities on 
average maintain a higher degree a political reality similarly to the time of the barracas (Ruiz 2005). 
The agro-extractivist communities were located near the regional towns Riberalta and 
Guayaramerin. While the extractivist communities were located in the former barraca areas, along 
the Orthon and Manupare rivers. Table 1 shows information on the 16 communities. 
 
We collected information to answer the following specific questions: (1) How did people allocate 
individual or collective de facto rights about the use of valuable forest resources under collective de 
jure land and forest rights? (2) Did the legal reforms facilitate or hamper the process of setting 
individual and collective rights? (3) To what extent did people rely on their customary rules to 
increase benefits from new collective rights granted by recent laws? From October 2008 until April 
2010 we used semi-structured interviews to collect information to answer those specific questions. 
The number of interviews was determined by the principle of information saturation, (Guest et al., 
2006). We also interviewed nine professionals and five traders with ample knowledge about the 
region or about specific communities, resulting in a total of 171 in-depth interviews. 
Simultaneously to the interviewing, we attended important communal events, for instance, 
communal assemblies, training events about rules design, and communal natural resource 
allocation events when they took place. We also interviewed 18 focus groups. We conducted 
qualitative data analysis (Guest et al., 2006; Brown, 2010) and aimed at identifying patterns and 
salient themes related to the subject of the research, but also to demonstrate the variation in how 
social phenomena related to natural resource allocation are framed, articulated, and experienced 
within institutions formation and rules design. 
 
4 Results: modalities of land distribution and forest resource rights assignment 
 
From our analysis we distinguished three modalities of distributing land and granting forest 
resource rights after communities received collective tenure. In this section we describe those 
three modalities, which include the rules that communities established internally, and evidence of 
how these rules were implemented, until the moment that we carried out field research. The 
modalities differ mostly in terms of rules, assigned rights, and obligations of community members. 
These are the results mostly of decision taken at communal assemblies, the highest community 
authority, and in which all household heads are obliged to participate. Decisions are taken by 
majority votes at community assemblies and recorded. It is the responsibility of the communal 
board, a legally prescribed communal governance structure with a president, treasurer, secretary 
and vocals. Table 2 summarizes the three modalities and where they were observed. 
 
Free access forest resource management 
 
Under the free access forest resource management modality, land distribution is guided by the 
principle of equitable access to valuable forest resources. Two subtypes of this modality can be 
distinguished. In the first, the concentration of valuable forest resources in a limited number of 
locations was the main constraint, and an equal division of land would not guarantee equal access 
to resources. In the second subtype a more equal distribution of the valuable forest resources 
occurred, but the resource levels were insufficient to ensure access to equal amounts of resources 
for all community members. In both subtypes, community members opted for a common land 
tenure arrangement, and resisted partitioning or assigning forest areas to individual households. 
Communities developed rules to regulate equal access. Land property rights were held by the 
entire group, which guaranteed access security for everybody. Individual rights could only be 
alienated in favor of other community members, but not outsiders, unless there were more 
resources than the group needed or was able to manage. The rights that could be alienated were 
over forest resources and not over land per se. 
 
Communities that adopted the free access forest resource management modality developed their 
own procedures to assign rights. In communities that hold common land tenure in the strictest 
sense, decisions on access rights were made by the entire community. Access to Brazil nut trees, 
for instance, followed three simple but consistent rules. One, the community defines every year a 
common starting date to harvest Brazil nut, and nobody is allowed to start harvesting prior to that 
day. Two, the amount of Brazil nuts to be harvested depends on a family’s capacity. Families that 
have fewer members than the average family are allowed to hire workers or resort to relatives for 
help. Three, the allocation of harvest areas to individual families is also decided collectively and can 
vary from year to year. In some cases there is no allocation of harvest areas and families can 
choose their own area and trees they want to harvest. In other cases, harvesting areas are being 
assigned but they rotate randomly between families every harvest season. 
 
When the opportunity to sell timber occurs, community consensus is required. Without such a 
consensus, no one takes the initiative. The benefits from timber sales were divided equally and 
logging is often negotiated with a private timber enterprise that also takes care of the legal 
procedures. The communal assembly assigned a committee to monitor timber extraction, but most 
people took part in actually monitoring, sometimes for short periods of time as assigned by the 
communal assembly. In other cases when the assembly decided to select a permanent monitoring 
committee, community members helped the committee members with their daily chores, for 
instance, Brazil nut harvesting or agriculture. Only in case of an economic emergency can 
community members sell timber independently without communal approval. However, they have 
to inform the community leaders about the sale. 
 
For other forest products, for instance palm heart (mostly Euterpe precatoria Mart., Stoian, 2005) 
different rules were applied. In such case, community members were allowed to harvest palm 
heart for their own consumption or sale. In the latter case, community members were expected to 
communicate their plans to the communal assembly. They are only allowed occasionally to engage 
in the collection and sale of any forest product, to assure that resource stocks in the communal 
forest are not exhausted. 
 
Common-access and individual natural resource management 
 
The common-access and individual natural resource management modality of assigning land and 
forest resource access rights is linked to a single valuable forest product, Brazil nut and to 
agriculture which seems to need different forms of tenure for its access and use. The communities 
which adopted this modality used to be part of a previous barraca, and barraca workers were 
assigned a specific Brazil nut forest area for harvesting. The barraca holder assigned those areas 
considering the estimated amount of Brazil nuts the area could yield, and the distance of the area 
to the village. The barraca holder favored some workers during this allocation, to create a social 
hierarchy among workers as a mechanism to maintain control over the workforce (Stoian, 2005). 
Brazil nut extractive communities with a barraca history opted for this modality of forest access 
rights. Under this tenure modality there are no locally defined land property rights, only temporary 
allocations of Brazil nut centers, or locations where Brazil nuts are temporarily stored during the 
harvest season, a remnant of the organization of harvesting during the barraca era (Stoian, 2005). 
In these communities, politically powerful families continue to dominate. 
 
In five of the 16 communities family clans within a single community dominated an area that had 
been part of a different barraca in the past. After the agrarian reform of the 1990s, family clans 
exercised land rights over communal lands as stipulated by the various laws, but each clan 
managed its domain following its own rules. Under this modality, rights over Brazil nuts located in 
a delimited area can be transferred to community members or outsiders, and the current owner 
takes an autonomous decision to that extent, although the final decision is subject to the 
communal assembly’s deliberations. 
 
For other non-timber forest resources there are often rules that constrain the amount that can be 
harvested and the purpose of their use. Because Brazil nuts are the most important source of 
income, people have the right to collect and sell them, sometimes without restrictions, sometimes 
limiting the quantity of trees that can be harvested by a family and hired collectors. This rule 
intends to prevent conflicts when collectors hired from outside the village trespass into areas with 
Brazil nut trees belonging to others, or to prevent community members from invading neighboring 
Brazil nut areas. The productive potential of each Brazil nut center and a family’s labor reserve are 
the main factors taken into account when Brazil nut areas are assigned, restriction imposed, or 
compliance with the rules is assessed. 
 
The second 500 hectares Government Decree initially did not accommodate with the 
common-access and individual natural resource management modality of land distribution and 
resource access. Observing that a distribution of land into 500 ha plots for each family did not 
ensure equitable access to Brazil nut trees few communities were motivated to initiate a new local 
land distribution based on former rules. The new approach not only implied a fair natural resource 
distribution, but also the overcoming of a social power imbalance from the past. In other cases, 
however, family clans tried to hold on to their power, and control of larger areas of Brazil nut forest, 
and tried to prevent the innovative local distribution that assured equal access. In some 
communities more than one family clan struggled to hold on to power and control of land and 
forest, dividing the community into a number of sub-communities each regulated by their 
respective dominant clan rules. 
 
In five communities that adopted the common-access and individual natural resource management 
modality of land and forest resource rights allocation, selling other forest products is not allowed 
unless it benefits all community members. Collection of forest products for personal consumption 
is allowed from the area over which rights are held. However, when the opportunity to sell timber 
occurs, but the village does not come to an agreement, village members often turn to 
non-authorized selling of timber. As a rule, however, timber is only sold collectively, because the 
spatial distribution of timber stocks does not allow for a distribution that assures equitable access 
to all. The income from timber is equally distributed among community members. 
 
Individual tenure and natural resource management 
 
The individual tenure and natural resource management modality was common within 
communities that engage in both agriculture and extractive activities, but were established long 
before the second agrarian reform, and had already adopted individual tenure over land and forest 
areas with valuable forest products (Stoian and Henkemans, 2000). After the reforms, the 
communities maintained individual tenure, with clearly defined boundaries between neighboring 
parcels. Before these communities were legally recognized as a consequence of the second 
agrarian reform, there were no rules that regulated land acquisition. Interviewees assert that in 
that time newcomers or residents could freely colonize new land, as long as land belonging to 
others was respected. These principles were essentially maintained after the communal land titling. 
While legally the communal land belongs to all community members, there is a marked 
differentiation of family assets. Currently we found that in some communities family holdings may 
vary between more than 1000 hectares to only 10 hectares, and yield varies between more than 
3000 kg ($US 2040) of Brazil nut per year to no Brazil nuts at all. Thus land tenure security rests on 
the imminent necessity and capacity of individual owners, and is supported by a strong private 
property rights perception. The sale of land is at the discretion of the owner who communicates 
any decision to that extent to the community leadership, but not the community assembly. The 
rights in this case are given for a predefined area of land and for all its natural resource. 
 
Communities with an individually owned natural resource management modality exercised 
individual property rights, and the distribution of valuable natural resources is subject to land right 
tenure. The distribution of land and forest resource ownership reflects time of residence in the 
village, because people who arrived first in the community had the opportunity to select their 
parcel with valuable forest resources. The right to harvest Brazil nuts or any other kind of 
non-timber forest product is held by the owner of the land and not the community.  
 
The right to log timber for sale, however, is arranged differently, as the legal status of communal 
lands obliges community members in principle to prepare a communal forest management plan 
collectively. Well organized communities prepare and implement such a plan under a solid 
communal administration, although equity and democratic decision making is much defined by 
powerful groups. These powerful groups are wealthy households and their direct relatives. 
Oftentimes these are descendants of previous barraca owners, or of people with powerful 
positions in the old barracas. Benefits, however, are distributed equally and monitoring is effective. 
Indeed in some cases, communities blocked unauthorized timber extraction, and forced the 
company engaged in the extraction, to pay when it had infringed on the agreement. Communities 
that had more difficulties to cooperate internally did elaborate the required forest management 
plan, but the share of benefits to each community member depended on the timber stock on 
people’s individual plots of land. In the case that communities could not agree to elaborate a 
collective forest management plan, people used “clearing plans” to log and sell timber, which can 
be given to individual holders for up to two hectares per year. 
 
Summary of modalities of land distribution and forest resource rights assignment 
 
Under the free-access forest resource management modality, the individual rights became evident 
only after people arrange collective rights to land and forest resources. Collective rights are defined 
to make sure that everybody has the same opportunities. In these communities providing equal 
conditions to each family group is the single most important standard that defines social 
relationships, and thus land and forest resource tenure and governance. This modality suggests 
that people are able to deal with negative consequences of open-access natural resource 
appropriation, which is in accordance with what was argued by Ostrom (1990; 1999; 2000). Our 
interpretation is that communities that choose this modality were guided by the key principle that 
all community members should have the same rights and the only way to assure those rights is by 
limiting people’s individual rights, which forces community members to adjust their own benefit 
expectations in relation to the resources available and the rights of others. 
 
The common-access and individual forest resource management modality was adopted because it 
is difficult with one single strategy to adjust for multiple valuable forest resources (Brazil nut and 
timber). The only way to assure rights related to both timber and non-timber forest products was 
to define collective and individual rights. The experiences with the former barraca system probably 
determined why these communities could not easily agree on a singular community forest resource 
management. From our observation, but also from our interviews from people with insights in 
social trends in the region, it appears that depending on the presence of dominant family groups, 
this modality can lead to effective forest resource governance or subject collective and individual 
rights to the manipulation of powerful groups. In the latter case, when the vertical social structure 
does not allow for democratic decision-making, especially dominant group members benefit from 
opportunistic access to valuable forest resources. 
 
In communities in which individual natural resource management prevailed, individual rights were 
the guiding principle. Although these communities pursued collective forest resource management, 
this only took place after people have assured their individual property rights. The better these 
rights were defined, the more likely community members pursued some kind of collective action 
related to valuable forest resources that are difficult to privatize. When private rights were less 
clearly defined, people turned to opportunistic behavior, for instance through attracting seasonal 
harvesters from elsewhere or use forest resources without complying with rules. People also 




Our results suggest that the new land and forest regulations provided an opportunity for 
communities in the northern Bolivian Amazon to learn about and take collective action and 
self-organization. It also forced people to start designing their own communal land and forest 
resource rights. Under the new reforms, there was less threat of outsiders exploiting communal 
resources. The threat is now to what extent community members respect or manipulate formal 
rules that are being imposed through the new regulations, and informal rules that they have 
devised themselves, to capture benefits when negotiating forest products with outsiders. 
Community members themselves may also be tempted to use unauthorized or illegal means to 
harvest and sell forest products for their own advantage, essentially harming the entire community. 
Informal timber extraction is a clear example of this. The new regime imposes constraints on forest 
resource use, for instance because it demands that communities prepare management plans for 
timber extraction and in theory similar procedures for Brazil nut extractions. At the same time, 
however, it provides opportunity and incentives to self-organize. The distribution of land, under 
different use rights within communities, was the first serious self-organizational step based on local 
customs, although not always to favor all the community members in the same way, and not 
always in accordance with formal rules principles.  
 
Our findings suggest that the social and political structure of barracas provided the customary mold 
on which land distribution under the reform was based, largely influenced by the natural 
distribution of valuable forest resources. The previous barraca system appears to have influenced 
the equity and democracy in the distribution of land and access rights to forest resources in 
communities. Rural people of the region are defining customary rules and this process is still very 
dynamic and so far seems to have both positive and negative outcomes, when considering the level 
of democracy, equity and sustainability of the resulting community rules. 
 
According to the above analysis, the following principles influenced communal internal institutional 
responses and the formulation of rules and their enforcement in the northern Bolivian Amazon. 
While the legal reforms and related policies define the global framework for land and forest 
governance, people needed to respond to the reforms within the sphere that is for them to govern. 
There are multiple factors that explain or determine how single communities respond to the 
opportunities and the necessity to define natural resource governance within their communal 
territory after the implementation of the legal and policy reforms. This suggests that new statutory 
rights, like ownership over land and exclusiveness to benefit from forests on communal land, 
providing required procedures are followed, do not automatically deliver rights in practice and 
therefore there is an important hurdle that prevents communities from translating those rights into 
real benefits using forest resources (Larson et al., 2008). This is also a common feature in, for 
instance Nicaragua, Guatemala and Brazil (Pacheco et al., 2009). Our findings suggest, however, 
that in specific circumstances people themselves can find ways to fully exercise the rights bestowed 
by the government. 
 
Larson et al. (2008) suggest that forest reforms from the last two decades in tropical American 
countries tried to recognize preexisting customary rights within communities. Our findings, 
however, suggest that in Northern Bolivia former customary arrangements from the time of 
barracas were rejected by communities, as being unacceptable. But, these pre-reform 
arrangements still shape the formation of new community social frameworks, for instance in the 
form consolidation of dominant groups, principles of land distributions and valuable forest 
resource allocation. The influence of the latter factors may explain the dynamism of rule design and 
enforcement and the different configurations of individual and collective choices. The latter is 
closely related with the confusion generated by the new land and forest reforms, which led people 
to idealize and even exaggerate the new rights they had received. This poses the question whether 
regulations hinder (Kaimowitz, 2003) or facilitate (Ostrom, 2000) local productive and sustainable 
forest management.  
 
Our case studies suggest different forms of how communities adjust collective action, manifested 
as developing local institutions and rules making, under the influence of new laws. These findings 
represent an important contribution to our understanding of how people’s self-organization 
around common pool resource governance will evolve, given a particular set of legal reforms and in 
a particular cultural historical setting. Among the most important aspects observed are the link 
between self-organization and the ways the new rights related to land and forest become manifest. 
An important element is that collective action is not separated from private action that aims to 
benefit of individual rights when those find difficulties to reach recognition at the collective level. 
When that happens, collective action will be less effective as people will pursue strategies to 
benefit as much as possible from their share of the collective rights. In this case sustainability, 
equity and democracy become matters of power and hierarchy in social relations and this may lead 
to a new tragedy of the commons (cf. Hardin, 1968), for instance when powerful groups try to 
increase benefits which implies limiting opportunities of others. However, when the new rights find 
acceptance among people, self-organization takes place in order to arrange rules and obtain 
benefits from collectively managed forest resources, with greater prospects for sustainable 
exploitation. 
 
In the northern Bolivian Amazon the modifications of the legal an policy reforms that directly 
affected communal natural resource use created conditions that did not inhibit communities to 
adjust their local institutions and rules to regulate many aspects of vital natural resources use. 
Reformed regulatory regimes provide a new reference for the scope of individual and collective 
rights rendered as collective arrangements. In the Bolivian case, the formal rules and their 
enforcement were broad and not extremely constraining; they gave communities sufficient space 
to design arrangements as they best saw fit. The local institutional history, however, strongly 
conditioned the direction of the local institutional reforms. There was both sufficient space and a 
local heritage, including negative experiences of powerful entrepreneurs subjecting rural dwellers 
to exploitative rules. Within single communities, however, because of differences in experiences 
the outcomes were quite different. More remote communities that had longer been exposed to 
exploitative regimes by elite families chose different arrangements than communities that already 
had been exposed to a market economy linked to regional major towns. 
 
This has implications for the concept of polycentric view of natural resource governance (cf. 
Anderson and Ostrom, 2008; Nahendra and Ostrom, 2012). While it is advisable that the state 
develops governance arrangement that best adapt to local conditions, its limited capacity to do so 
can be compensated by communities, when they are left enough room to devise optimal ways to 
adopt and comply with official regulations. Communities will not necessary lose their capacity to 
self-regulate under reforms of natural resource governance regimes, providing that the conditions  
similar to the CPR design principles (Ostrom 1990; 1999; 2009) are not corrupted.  
    
6 Conclusions 
 
The tropical forestry sector has seen regulatory reforms in multiple locations world-wide. These 
reforms have included new legislations to refocus the forestry sector itself, but also legislations 
that aims to accommodate the role of forests in rural livelihoods or enhance the latter through 
creating opportunities to capture benefits previously monopolized by the economically powerful. 
Related trends, like devolution of forest and land ownership or decentralization to allow lower tiers 
of government to have more control over natural resource policies, including to better 
accommodate the preferences and needs of forest communities, have had mixed outcomes. There 
is some general understanding that devolution and decentralization are not sufficient and that 
subsequent communal self-organization is required for the reforms to take its full effect. This paper 
provides detailed evidence on how forest communities in northern Bolivia responded to forestry 
regulatory and policy reforms since the mid-1990s. Under the new regimes communities took 
matters in their own hands, and designed more specific rules rights and obligations of how 
community members could and should use economically important forest resources. The cases 
suggest that communities maintain capacity to prepare their own ownership arrangements and 
related rules, even if they are strongly conditioned by the regulatory reforms. This suggests that 
CPR design principles, as suggested by Ostrom (1990; 1999; 2009) remain valid even under the 
imposition of a new regulatory regime on which communities had little influence. The Bolivian case 
leaves open the question as to whether new regimes should define more in detail communal 
forestry institutions, or indeed assume that given the adequate conditions, self-regulation can be 
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Table 1.Main characteristic of the 16 forest communities related to population, 






Distance to main 
town 
Main forestry activities 
Agro-extractive and old communities 
Candelaria 50 3 Independent settlement 1.5 hours by road  
Timber and Brazil nut sale, 
swidden agriculture 
Campo Central 26 2 Independent settlement 30 min by road  
Timber and Brazil nut sale, 
swidden agriculture 
Cachuela Mamoré 53 0 Independent settlement 20 min by road  Commercial agriculture 
12 de Octubre 70 2 Independent settlement 30 min by road  
Timber and Brazil nut sale, 
swidden agriculture 
Rosario del Yata 200 0 Independent settlement 1 hour by road  Commercial agriculture 
San Lorenzo de 
Pampa 
23 3 Independent settlement 45 min by road  Commercial agriculture 
Miraflores 73 0 Independent settlement 2 hour by road  
Brazil nut sale, swidden 
agriculture 
Warnes 70 0 Independent settlement 30 min by road  
Agriculture, timber sale and 
a some Brazil nut sale 
Extractive and new communities 
Las Mercedes 70 3 Former barraca 
5 hours by road  
7 hours by boat 
Brazil nut sale 
Remanso 36 2 Former barraca 
6 hours by road  
6 hours by boat 
Brazil nut sale 
Península 13 1 Former barraca 5 days by boat Brazil nut sale 
Ingavi 23 1 Former barraca 3 days by boat Brazil nut and timber sale 
Santa Fé 25 1 Former barraca 5 hours by boat Brazil nut sale 
Fortaleza 27 1 Former barraca 2.5 days by boat Brazil nut sale 
Exaltación 30 1 Former barraca 12 hours by road  Brazil nut sale 
Contravaricia 36 1 Former barraca 5 hours by road  Brazil nut and timber sale 
* Dominant family is a large group of community members linked by acquired or direct family ties. Its strong 
influence on community issues and decision-making come from having being the first in arrive the community or 
power given by the patron in the barraca period. 
 
Table 2a. Rules for land distribution and forest resource access and 
use among the three modalities observed in the studied communities 
Modality Community 
Inner land distribution 
Land tenure 













(transfer) only or 
preferably among 
members is a 
collective 
agreement 
Collective area to 
agriculture, assigned 
randomly every year 







Mercedes/ Santa Fé/ 






among member or 
outsiders with the 
permission and 





within a defined 
collective area or within 
individual Brazil nut 
centers/ Collectively and 






Warnes/ San Lorenzo 
de Pampas/ Campo 
Central/ Candelaria/ 
Cachuela Mamoré/ 




among member or 
with outsiders with 
or without the 





agricultural plots within 
their own parcel based 
on own criteria 
 
Table 2.b. Rules for land distribution and forest resource access and use 
 among the three modalities observed in studied communities  
Modality Community 
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only in case 








































to sell wood as 
collective 
agreement 































































When timber is 
available in this 
communities 
the common 





























a  In these communities the existence of brazil nuts is exceptional and naturally poorly 
distributed. 
 
 
